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STOCK OPTiONS
A stock optiongranted by a corporation to oneof its executives stipulates
that he niay purchasefroni the firm, at anytime within a stated period,
a given numberof shares of its stock at aprice fixed on the date of grant-
ing. Since the economicbenefit the executive ultimatelyderives from
such an arrangementdepends directly on the futureprice behavior of
his company's stock, theoption has associated with it a high degree of
uncertainty and is, for that reason,particularly difficult to analyze. A
"current equivalent" can onceagain be developed, but it necessarily will
differ in several major respects fromthose created for forms of reward
whose contingencies are more readilytreated.
Orientation
For the moment, attention is directed solely toward the remunerative
aspects of the stock option, i.e., its actual monetary value to the execu-
tive and a translation of that value into current income figures. The
proclaimed ability of the device to elicit a certain kind of effort from
executives and to induce them to acquire a more substantial ownership
interest in their companies will be considered here only to the extent
that such factors bear upon the worth of the option and upon the
appropriateness of the alternative suggested for it. A comparison of the
costs of a stock option and its "current equivalent" will also be post-
poned to a later discussion.' While these matters are important in a
number of connections, an appraisal of the purely financial attributes of




Stock options have, inone form or another, beenused to reward execu-
tives for a good manyyears. Their real popularity,however, dates from 1950 when legislationwas enacted providing themwith favorable_and
assurcdtax treatment andestablishing definiteground rules for their design.Since then, virtually alloption agreements haveconformed to those guidelines.
The law specified that,as long as the option priceset was at least 95
per cent of the market price of thestock on the day the optionwas
granted, any income accruingto the executive asa result of the purchase
and later resale of suchstock would be considereda gain on the sale
of a capital asset and taxedat the rates applicable thereto.In order to
qualify for this treatment, theoption also had to henontransferable and of no more than ten years'duration. In addition,any stock acquired
could not be resold by theoptionee until twoyears after the date of grant-
ing nor until six monthsafter the date of exercise.Since these were rela-
tively mild requirements, however,the capital gains tax featuremade
stock options especiallyattractive to executives in viewof the high
marginal rates on their salaryand bonus earnings.
Typical Instruments
Within the general frameworkindicated, an option plancould be de-
signed quite flexiblyto fit the needs of both the individualexecutive and
his firm. In mostcases the maximum period permittedunder the law
Revenue Act of 1950, Section 218.A discusjon of the checkeredtax his- tory and utili2atiOn of stock optionsprior to 1950 is contained in GeorgeT. Washington and V. Henry Rothschild,Conpe:zsagjng the Corporate Executive, New York, l951,pp.121-135.
Options with prices as lowas 85 per cent of market price were sanctioned,
but their tax treatnientwas less sympathetic and they were granted infrequently.
In Appendix G a full descriptionof the relevant statutes is presented, including
the changes made by the RevenueAct of 1964. Since the empirical portionof this study will include dataon executives only through the end of 1963, the
pre-1964 tax law is the relevantone. The valuation procedures to be developed
can be adapted to the features of thenew statutes, however, as Appendix G
indicates. That djscusiøn ismost profitably referred to after reading thepresent chapter in its entirety.S ,,1
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was taken advantageof and the optionstipulated to l)e exercisable, at
the optionec'Sdiscretion, any time upto ten years fromthe date it was
granted, either in asingle bloc or inseveral installments. Depending on
the corporation'sobjectives,a shortertime limit was occasionaII'
adopted, and provisionwas sometiflieSmade for a fixed sequence of
exercises. For example,one-tenth of the totalnumber of optioned shares
might be eligible forpurchase by the executiveduring the first year of
the agreen1Cflt asecond one-tenth duringthe following year. and so on.
The large majorityof plans, however,simply specified the maximum
allowable ten-year termand did not insist on anyparticular pattern of
exercise.
Option prices were seldomset at less than thetax-encouraged 95 per
cent of market. Thatfigure and full marketprice on the date of granting
were by far thepredominant choices, with 95 per centbeing somewhat
the more common.
The other elements of optionplans were not as uniformly designed.
The number of executivesreceiving options, the proportionate ownership
share of the firm earmarked foroption grants, the formula by which those
grants were made to individualexecutives, the restrictions, either express
or implied, placed onthe resale of stock acquired underoption, the dis.
position of unexercised options upon thedeath, retirement, or resigna-
tion of the executive, and the extent of anyreciprocal obligation on the
part of the optionee to remain in theemploy of the issuing corporation
varied, and still vary, substantially from plan to plan.Fortunately, most
of these characteristics are important primarily from theviewpoint of
the internal compensation administrator and need not he examinedin
great detail in order to determine the worth of a stock optionand to
develop a current equivalent for it. The duration of the option and its
price are the significant factors for that interest.
The Reward Obtained from an Option
The essence of a stock option is, of course, the opportunity it provides
for its recipient to purchase marketable securities at a discount. He is
placed in a position where he can do something other investors cannot
and is thereby able to employ his investible funds in a superior manner.STOCK OPTIONs 49
There arc, however, two possible conceptualapproaches to measuring
the extent of the advantage which he enjoys.
The first is to treat the option as, in effect,a long-term "call" option
and therefore to fix its value to the executiveas of the date it is granted.
The argument would be that the right to purchase sharesof stock at an
established price anytime withina period of up to ten years is clearly
worth something in and of itself at the time it is createdregardless of
the actual results subsequently obtained from its exercise. Putanother
way, it would be possible in terms of the objectives of the current study
to conceive of the executive involved being able to specify in advance
the magnitude of the salary increase he would be willingto accept as a
substitute for any given option, i.e.,as its current income equivalent.
While conceptually this line of reasoning is persuasive, it does havesome
important drawbacks.
For one thing, the computational problems it raisesare severe. Even
though there is an active market in call options which providessome
prices that could be used as general guides to theex ante value of
executives' stock options, the contracts whichare sold in that market
are of no more than a year in duration, whereas every stock option
issued by the fifty firms in the present sample hada term of at least three
years. Actual prices cannot therefore be observed for the relevant
arrangements, and it would be necessary to rely instead on a theoretical
model of option valuation. While such models exist,4 they not onlyre-
quire that a subs iaitial amount of historical stock price information be
collected and simmarized each time an estimate of the worth ofa
new option is desired, but the discussions surrounding them have thus
far left open some key issues concerning their implementation: the
length of the time period over which historical data should be compiled,
the relative weights to be given different portions of that data, whether
the behavior of external economic indicators can be used to improve the
models' predictive ability, and so on. In short, a fairly sizeable security
4 See, for example: A. James Boness, "Elements of a Theory of Stock Option
'ides Value,"Journal ofPolitical Economy, No. 2, April1964, Pp.163-175; 0.
Giguere, "Warrants: A Mathematical Method of Evaluation," AnalystsJour-
Ic IS nal, No. 14, 1958, pp. 17-25; Paul A. Samuelson, "Rational Theory of War-
mot rantPricing." Industrial Management Review, Vol.6, No. 2,Spring1965, U
pp. 13-32. A comprehensive general reference in this area is Paul H. Cootner,


















valuation effortwould be calledfor if this approach wereadopted. A
commitment to thatsort of anundertaking does not seem appropriate
within the frameworkof the presentstudy, especially since it wouldif
properlyexecuted_almost certainlyoverwhelm the original concern
with the compensationpackage itself.5
A second pointconcerns theapplicabilitY of such a procedure to
actual compensationsituationsan issuewhich has been stressed in
connection with thecurrent incomeequivalents of other rewards. Given
the difficultiesinvolved in estimatingfuture stock prices, it seems un-
likely that any predictiveformula adopted herewould be widely accepted
by businessmen 01.even whereaccepted, that its parameters could be
agreed upon inpractice by bothparties to particular compensation
transactions. Thus, one canimagine the difficulty thatwould be en-
countered by a corporatecompensation administrator inattempting to
reach agreement withhis company's executives onthe ex ante value of
their proposed stock options.Now, it is true that the currentequivalents
developed above for pensionand deferred compensation arrangements
have some ex anteelementsthe use of a discountfor mortality in
determining present values, forexample. But itis also true that the
relevant contingencies havebeen analyzed so extensivelywith the aid of
large amounts of datathatthenecessary conceptual framework
(actuarial science) and its empiricalimplementation (the mortality
table) are no longer subjects of controversy.Whenever an appraisal of
such contingencies is called for, then,it can be made with both con-
fidence and precision. A similar claim is not yetpossible for ex ante
stock price estimates.
If these strictures are accepted, the clearalternative is to value the
option according to the events which, in fact, follow fromits employment.
This can easily be done by considering the cost to the executiveof pur-
chasing his finn's stock if he were not the beneficiary of an option grant,
It should also be noted that the question of the shape of executives' wcalth
utility functions would be raised by an ex ante stock option valuation procedure
Thus, in order to determine what salary increase the executive would he willing
to accept in place of an option before knowing what will happen to the price
of his firm's stock, the strength of his aversion to "gambling" on the option as
compared with receiving a guaranteed series of salary payments would have 10
beconsidered.Thisagainisanissuewhichrequiresfotitsresolution
more of an analytical digression than seems desirable in the present CirCUm
stances.STOCK OPTIONS 51
i.e., he would have to pay the fullmarket price for the shares inques-
tion, On that basis, the differencebetween the option priceto which
he is entitled and the actual market priceof the shares as of the date the
option is exercised measures theextent of the advantage vis-à-vis other
investors which he ultimately turnsout to enjoy That difference is taken
here to be the most practicable indexof the worth of a stock optionto
its recipient. It removes any need forspeculation about future stock
prices and renders ourmeasurements independent of the attitudes of the
executive and the company at the timethe option is granted.It also
implies that the resulting current incomeequivalent will embody the
same sort of incentive features as the option itself.
Thus, it is often claimed that stockoptions are designed toencourage
behavior on the part of executives whichwill bring about an increase in
the price of their firms' stock.7 Whilean appraisal of such arguments is
not our main concern here, there issome merit in developing a valuation
procedure whichas does thatproposedgives risetoa current
equivalent whose magnitude dependson actual stock price movements
subsequent to the date the option is granted.If, then, there is any truth
in the claims advanced,a stream of salary payments having this charac-
teristic would, as a substitute for the option,provide a similar degree of
encouragement to its recipient to identify himself with theposition of his
firm's shareholders. An entirelycx ante approach to stock option
valuation would have none of that flavor.
It would be wrong, however, tocarry this line of reasoning to the con-
clusion that the compensation provided byan option ought to be measured
on the day the optionce eventually disposes of his stock and therebyreal-
izes his profits. That procedure would failto draw the necessary distinc-
tion between the option transaction,on the one hand, and the investment
decision which follows, on the other. The day theexecutive exercises his
right to purchase certain shares of stockat a discount, the action which
was singularly open to him because he was granteda stock option is
formally completed. At that time his advantageover the market is
claimed, and he stands thereafteron the same basis with regard to in-
Wecannot,ofcourse,be surethat any valuation procedure when applied
empirically to executives' past option experienceswillfurnish a reliable guide
to future developments See especially the discussionin Chapter8.,
See, for example: Henry FordII, "StockOptions AreinthePublicInterest,'
!iarvar,J BusinessReview, July--August, 1961.--
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creasesand decreasesin the valueOt I.tS( lIflS dOCS therest
of theinvestmCt comi1UflYThe ' of acptioni', r
correctlYdetermined, cxpostby market events,hut only up to that
eventhIh signifiesthe exhaustionof the SpCC!1I prixtkges it confcrs
The mechanicsof translatingthe value thusOhtliflC(lJ1t) a stream of
current incomeequivalent paymentsare outlinedbelow.
A fter- Tax Rcss'ards
While not solabeled, theforegoing discussionhas. in fact. been con.
cerned withidentifying andmeasuring before-tax remuneration. When
the executixeultinlately resellSstock acquired under option, of course,
he is assessed acapital gains tax onthe difference between its value at
that time and itsoriginal cost to him.Since whatever the magnitude of
that difference, oneof its componentsis the discount from market price
which was obtained onthe day the option wasexercised, this discount
should be considered abefore-tax reward and the amountof tax attrib-
utable thereto subtractedin order to convert it to anafter-tax measure.
The executives withwhom we shall be concerned (thosefor whom data
are available from proxystatements) had incomes large enough to make
it advantageous for them tochoose to be taxed at the 25 per cent flat
capital gains rate on an' profitsrealized. Therefore. as a first approxima-
tion, the stock option's after-taxreward can be defined simply as 75 per
cent of the difference betweenoption price and market price on the date
of exercise.
including the necessity of waiting six months before selling ansshares in
order to qualify for capital gains tax treatment. The reader isreminded again
that the pre-1964 tax lawis the relevant one for the present discussion.
01 course, along with those 'special privileges' ma' also go somespecial
constraints. Because of pressures exerted on them either formally or informally
by their companies, for instance, most executives are likely to he reluctant to
resell shares acquired through the exercise of stock options evenshen market
conditions would ordinarily lead them to do so. Such sales may he interpreted
as an espression oftackof confidenceinthe compans piospects and he
frossned onand effectively deterredfor that reason As a result, the e\eeUt!'C
might be induced by a stock option to hold a larger proportion of his personal
investment portfolio in the form of the common stock of his employer than coti
siderations of efficient diversification would dictate.In some sense. then, the
optionisreally worth lessin such situations than the discount from market
price it provides would sIIgQest. Hossever. since both the extent of that loss anJ
the frequency ofits occurrence are almost iniposihle toquantifY, theyiii
necessarily he ignored here.STOCK OPTIONS 53
This procedure might, however,be open to criticismon several counts.
First, the optionee may retainpossession of his stock until hedies and
thereby avoid entirely thepayment of taxes on its appreciation invalue.
To the extent that this occurs,and it is probably notuncommon, a 25
per cent tax rate assumption willoverstate the true average liability and
understate the over-all after-taxcompensation generated by options.
Even though there is no informationcurrently available which indicates
how often this situation arises,a bias will clearly exist unlesssome offset
is provided. Accordingly theconvention here will be thata tax rate of
20 per cent is a more appropriatefigure to use. While arbitraryand
quite unverifiablethe resultingadjustment does at leastoperate to
change the imputed tax liabilities inthe proper direction. It is certain
that, on average, 25 per cent isincorrect and the lower rate should be
regarded simply as an approximation of the"right" figure.
A second point concerns the deferralrather than the complete elimi-
nation of the capital gains tax. Evenif optioned stock is actually resold
by the optionee, there is a time lag betweenits purchase and that sale,
which suggests that the amount of theassociated tax payment should be
diminished in present value termsto reflect its postponement relative to
the date the option is exercised. Forsimplicityand once again for lack
of pertinent datathe assumption will be thatthe necessary adjustment
for this factor is also included in thereduction of the applicable tax
rate to 20 per cent.
Finally, there is the matter of the deductionsfrom taxable income
which may be generated by option profits. If theoptionee is induced to
increase his charitable contributionsor, perhaps, is forced to borrow
and incur deductible interest charges in orderto obtain funds to exercise
his options, his taxable income will be lowered.Since capital gains are
taxed at a fiat rate, any additional deductionsso created will be sub-
tracted by him from income which is taxableat "ordinary income" rates.
The question, therefore, is whether stock option profits,some of which
may exist only on paper, have a significant influenceon deductible ex-
penditures. Certainly, there should besome impact as long as the
optionee is not completely insensitive to the fact thathe has become a
wealthier man. On the other hand, the timing of suchexpenditures is
uncertain. They may occur even before exercise,as potential option






























follow later. In effect,the same problemIS contronted as in the ca;e of
executives who mayhold their optIondstk until they die and thus
avoid the capitalgains tax: SOffiCadjustment is necessary,hut there is
really no way ofknowing just howlarge it should he.'°For that reason,
a similarsolutiOn will beadopted. The effective taxrate assumed on
stock option incomewill be loweredanother 5 per cent to 15 per cent.
This reduction isintended to approximate orat least have the same
qualitative effect as,the tax saving on currentincome which might ensue
from the extradeductions encouragedby a profitable stock option.
Again, the intent ofthe assumption issimply to remove in a convenient
way some partof what wouldotherwise be a persistent understatement
of the value of anoption.11
The A fter-Ta.v CurrentEquivalent
Having decided upon amethod by which to measurethe after-tax
reward provided by anoption, we may nowconsider the design of a
technique to compare itwith the other componentsof the pay package.
To that end, the approa'htaken previously in connection with pensions
and deferred compensationplans, whereby an "after-tax current equiva-
lent" was constructed, can berepeated. Accordingly, the question will
be posed: Flow much of anincrease in the optionee'S annual after-tax
salary would be necessary werehe to be as well rewarded by that in-
crease a he is by hisstock option?
There .re, of course, several dimensions to afull description of such
a device. One is thestandard by which equality of reward is to be judged.
° There is, however, some evidence to indicate that the taxsavings may be
quite s bstantialas much as one-half the 25 percent capital gainstax---if
the dedictions associated with capitalgains are proportionately the same as
those pctning to ordinary income. See D. M. Hollandand W. Ci. Lewellen.
"Probing the Record of Stock Options," Harvard Business Review,MarchApril
1962.
11 In principle,the correct procedure would be to estimate the additional
deductions at some percentage of option profits, to allocate those amounts to
the various years in which they are considered likely to be claimed bythe
executive, and then to calculate the resulting tax savings according to theactual
salary, bonus, and "outside income" received by him during those years. 0b
viously, this would become a rather demanding process, hut because 01 the
necessity to make a number of assumptions without much supporting evidence
it would not yield the compensating benefit of a great improvement iii the ac





Consistent with the principleestablished earlier, thetfter-tax present
value of each current eqtiivaknt willbe matched with that of the option
whose substitute itis intended torepresent. A second element is the
period over which the current equivalentshould be spread. In the ab-
sence of any support for a different Convention,it seems reasonable to
specify thc same term of years that isprovided in the optionagreement.
Thus, if the option is exercisableat any time within ten years from the
day it is granted, its replacement willconsist of a stream of ten annual
salary payments.'2
Even if these propositionsarc accepted, however, the featurcs of
what might be a sensible current equivalentare not as evident in the
case of a stock option as they are for other formsof compensation. The
difficulty lies in the peculiar nature of thedeViCe which led above to the
view that its remunerative achievementscan be properly assessed only
after some action is taken by the optionce.The contingencies associated
with a pension plan were seen to be welldefined, and an almost identical
instrument is available to the executive elsewhereon an individual basis.
These conditions, which gave rise toa very clear "anticipatory" current
income counterpart of the pension,are not met by a stock option. The
cx post character of the reward in question causesa real problem in
constructing a current equivalent which will (1)span the full term ol
the option it replaces, (2) be as valuable withoutperfect foresight, and
(3) have some operational possibilitiesandattractionsfor the cor-
poration. Unless the current equivalent exhibits allthree qualities, itis
not, in the view here, a truly satisfactory vehicle forexpressing the
relationship between the option and the remainderof the executive's
compensation.
By that standard, the following procedureseems to accomplish, as
well as any of the wide range of available alternatives,the objective
desired. At the end of each calendaryear after an option is granted, its
prospective after-tax worth is estimatedby assuming itto be 85 per
12Despite the fact that a stock option is necessarily exercisedat a particular
point in time,it would he misleading to attribute the entire financial gain which
results to the dayor even the yearof exercise. That gain is realizedbecause of ahistory of stock price changes and the wide discretion enjoyed by the
executivein choosing when to take advantage of his rights. Thus, while the
exercise of an option is a discrete event, (he benefitsit confers depend on and




cent of the difTerencebetwcefl theoption price and thestock's market
price at that time.Beginning in thesucceeduig ycir and continuing
through the final yearof the option's term,the optionec's annual after-
tax salary isincreased by an amountsuch that the resulting series of
payments has apresent valueequal to the estimateobtained. '[his
proceSS is repeatedannually until theend of the calendar year in which
the executiveexercises his option---andtherefore determines the actual
magnitude of hisreward. Thus, in each yearan additional stream of
salary payments isbegun whose after-taxpresent value is equal to the
change in theestimated after-tax valueofthe option during the year.
The outcomeofall this is a currentequivalent which resembles that
described for a pensionarrangement: a seriesof "layers"ofsalary in-
creases, each onecorresponding to an incrementin the (expected)
value of the executive'scompensation. At the endof the yeai of exercise,
the interest_aecuniulatedtotal of the salary paymentsmade in anticipa-
tion of thenow_measurable option gain issubtracted from that gain,
and the difference isadjusted for by awarding theoptioriee a final series
of additions to salarytheseto replace all othersand have a present
value equal to the differenceindicated. In effect, the current equivalent
varies in size according to thedeveloping experience under the option-
i.e., the pattern of stockprice changes---Up to the point when the option
is exercised, at which time itsremaining components are fixed.
Consider the following example: OnAugust 1, 1952, an executive is
granted an option to purchase, at anytime within the next four years,
ten thousand shares of hiscompany's stock at a price of $95 per share.
On the day of granting, the market priceof the stock is $100, and by
December 31, 1952, it has risen to $105 per share.The option would
therefore be worth, after taxes, 85 per cent of (10,000)($105 -$95),
or $85,000 if it were exercised at thattime. In the expectation of an
eventual exercise, a series of four annual increments to the optionee's
salary is initiated. For convenience, let us suppose that the promise of
an extra $24,000 after taxes per year in each of the years1953 through
1956 would have a present value equal to $85,000.1Accordingly,
$24,000 is attributed to the executive, as the first portion of his current
equivalent, in 1953. On December 31 of that year, a second appraisal
















of the situation is made. If the market priceof the stock involved has
climbed to $125 per share. an additional $170,000 in potential after-tax
reward will have been generated, To reflectthis change, an increase in
the man's current equivalent isnecessary. Again for the sake of nu-
merical simplicity, let us assume that threeannual payments, in this
case for 1954, 1955, and 1956, of $60,000 each havea $170,000 total
present value. The optionee is therefore credited with $84,000worth of
current equivalent in 1954. On October 1 he exercises his option in full.
At that time, the market price of the stock purchased is$1 19 per share,
resulting in an after-tax reward equal to $204,000by the definition
above.14 Now, installments totaling $108,000 have been "paid"in antici-
pation of this event. With interest, they would haveaccumulated to
approximately $1 10,000 by October 1, 1954.Thus, a net of $94,000
is still "due" the executive, and two payments of,say, $50,000 each in
1955 and 1956 complete his current equivalent.16
With this approach itis possible to reconcile the apparent conflict
between the desire for a current equivalent which extendsover a period
of timebeginning when the option is grantedand the principle that
the actual compensation afforded by that devicecan be determined
accurately only in retrospect. Having done so, wecan perhaps claim
to combine the virtues of both cx ante and cx post techniques. The
choice of the end of the calendar year as the day on which to perform
the periodic assessments of the prospective value of an option is merely
for convenience; any date would do. The most obvious alternative is the
anniversary of the option grant itself, but for the purpose of calculating
current equivalents for a large number of executives,itis easier to
specify one common date and collect stock price data only for it.17 In any
event, the general format of the after-tax current equivalent is fairly
simple, and itis offered here not only as a useful instrument by
which to compare the option with other rewards, but also as a workable
substitute that should be brought to the attention of corporations in
'That is, 85 per cent of (10.000) (S 119 - $95).
For the procedure involvedsee the section on "present and cumulative
values" below.
16 Itsfinal form is:l953$24,000; 1954S84,000; 1955-550,000; 1956--
$50,000. The reason for the variation in annual amounts is, of course, the change
in stock prices observed, particularly the drop in 1954 prior to exercise.
1And, of course, assessments could he made at more frequent intervals such
as every six months or every quarter.*
I
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designing their executivecompensation packages. Tluis a firm might
"shadow" stock options toitsniatiigeuial group and use the
current equivalentdescribcd as the actual meansof payment. For in-
stance, the executivecould he told. "We will compensate you aswell as
if you had such-and-such anoption, but you will he given instead an
increase in your salaryeach year which depends onthe price of our
stock just as the value of thatoption would have. Let us know when you
eventually would haveexercised the Option, and we'll settle up then
with a final series of salaryincrements." In effect, the proposal is for a
variable component of salarywhich will act as a proxy for the changing
potential value of the option itreplaces.
Mortality Conside'ations
In the development of currentincome equivalents for pensions and de-
ferred compensation arrangements, it wasdeemed necessary to take into
account the possibility that theexecutive in question might not live to
receive some or all of the paymentspromised. The present value of both
rewards was therefore computed using a discountfor mortality as well
as for time deferral. In the caseof a stock option this additional dis-
count is not required. The optionec's estateis permitted by law to
exercise his option if he should die and, it may be assumed, will do so
if that instrument has a positive value. While the relevant statutes sanc-
tion such an exercise up to the end of the original term of the option,
all but a few companies specify a foreshortening of this period in the
event of the optionee's death. In the large majority of plans, exercise
must take place within a year thereafter. By making regular appraisals
of the worth of the option in the manner described above, we therefore
ensure that the actual financial gain it provides, if exercised by the
executive's heirs, willeven though that gain is impossible to determine
from any published sourcebe reasonably close to the most recent
estimate made. Thus, if a series of salary payments is constructed which
varies with changes in this estimate, those payments should represent
an appropriate alternative to the option regardless of whether its initial
recipient or his descendants exercise it.
Tax considerations are neutral in this respect also.1s According to










the law, an estate tax is payable on thedifference between the market
price of the stnck on the date of the optionee'sdeath and its designated
option price. Under the same rule, however, thebasis for calculating
any capital gains achieved through the resale of stock acquiredby
exercising an inlieritea option is correspondingly increased.For example,
if an executive should die holdingan option to purchase shares of his
company's stock for $20 at a time when the market priceof that stock
is $50, an estate tax would be assessedon the $30 difference. Were the
option to be exercised subsequently and the stockresold for $90, only
$40 of that amount would be subject to a capital gainstax. If, then, it is
assumed, as was done previously, that the over-all effectivetax rate
levied on the estates of executives is likely to be closeto the 25 per cent
capital gains rate payable on any stock option profits theythemselves
might obtain, there is no need to make an adjustment intax liabilities for
the possibility that the executives may not live to exercise theiroptions.
There is, in short, no additional tax due, and approximately thesame
rate applies to the stock price differential which defines the executive's
reward if he lives and which is taken to be the best estimate of the
benefit claimed by his estate if he does not.
Mortality is a factor on the other side of the compensation "equation,"
however. It was asserted earlier that a current equivalent must becom-
posed entirely of direct payments to the executive if it is to be, as ad-
vertised, a true current income alternative. Hence any scheme thatre--
quires a continuation of payments to the man's estate following his death
is unsuitable. The salary increments which comprise the stock option's
current equivalent must therefore be large enough to generate the
necessary present values when they are discounted for both futurity and
mortality. The promise of an annual salary increase extending some
years into the future can only be made contingent upon its intended
recipient's remaining alive. Since this is the sort of promise advocated
here as a possible substitute for the stock optionor, at least, as a
useful restatement of its compensatory valuethe computations must
take into account the fact that the executive's survival is not certain.
In the illustration above, for example, the first series of four salary pay-
ments might have to be, say, $25,000 per year instead of $24,000 in
order for them to represent the required $85,000 present value. Similar
upward revisionsinthe other figures originally obtained are also60 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
necessary. The ultimateimpact of thesechangc em the "typical'' C1Irre
equivalent will probably notbe very great, but they are correct in
principle and, for that reason,should be undertaken.'Moreover, the
ready availability ofmortality data makes thetask of doing so quite
simple.2° If, then, anexecutive should die holding anunexereised option
or before havingreceived all the salary paymentsdue him under the
current equivalent of anoption he has exercised, thc-re is no need for
any adjustment onthat accountand nobasis for a concern that the
attenuated series of paymentswhich results somehow understates his
reward.
Discount Rate
The opportunity cost used totransform the financial gain provided by a
stock option into a series ofannual payments spread over a period of
years should, bydefinition, indicate the return available from the invest-
ment activity in which theoptionee might engage if his option actually
were substituted for inthe manner described. For two reasons it seems
sensible to consider investment in commonstocks his most appropriate
choice. First of all, much has been madeof the point that the reward
obtained from a stock option should be measured by tinet advantage
it confers when compared with its closest marketakernativL. That alter-
native was taken to be the purchase of the shares acquired unuoption
at their market price on the date of exercise.From that view folk.''d
also the notion that stock price developments thereafter were irrelevant,
since they represented occurrences to which all investors were subject
regardless of the circumstances surrounding their original stock pur-
chases. In short, the value of an option is determined by the differences
and the similarities between it and the opportunities open to the ordinary
common stock investor.
Secondly, the role which an option can be thought of as playing in the
'In the absence of mortality considerations and assuming a discount rate
of 5 per cent per annum, a series of ten annual payments of $12,330 each
made at the beginning of every year would have a present value equal to
$100,000. If those payments were to Constitute part of a current equivalent for
a man aged 50, the additional discount for mortality would require that the pay-
ments be $12,760 each in order to generate the same present value.
.0 As was true in the case of pensions and deferred compensation arrange-
ments, the 1951 Group Annuity Table for Males will be used.STOCK OPTIONS
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executive's personal financial planning isone which could lonicallybe filled by a portfolio of equities. It was decidedabove that thecurrent
equivalent designed for a pension plan shouldprovide the sameSort of
basic postretireinent economic security. Bysimilar reasoning, boththe
uncertainty and the profit potentialassociated with the stockoption
suggest that the executive should be inclinedto pursue an investment
policy having the same characteristics withany funds offered himas its replacement. Thus, an optionin effectand by intentmakesits
recipient a stock market investor, and itscurrent equivalent should be
calculated using a discount rate which reflectsthat condition.
It remains then to choose a specific figurethat reconciles the various
pieces of evidence and opinion that existabout the likelyoutcome of
employing capital in the purchase ofcommon stocks. A substantial
amount of information on the returns thatcould have been achieved
through the ownership of a diversified portfolioof equities over the last
three or four decades has been made availablein a study conductedat
the University of Chicago.21 The conclusionreached was that after-tax
yields from dividends plus capital appreciationwould have rangedgen-
erally between 5 and 10 per cent perannum, depending on the particu-
lar time period involved andon the individual's personal incometax
bracket. Executives might be expectedto have done somewhat betteron
average than the typical investor because of their businessexperience and
their access to both information andopportunities. On the other hand,
they are subject to the upper end of the incometax rate schedulewhich
serves to constrain their net profitsand itmust be remembered that
the returns describedwere calculated in retrospect. The men whocom-
prise the sample for this study wouldhave been conditioned in their
investment behavior by the unhappyfinancial events of the late 1920's
and the l930's. While itmay today be generally believed, with some
justification, that business indexesand stock prices move inevitablyup-
ward, many current investorshave been exposed to a different sort of
learning process andoperate within a different sort of economicen-
vironment than those executives whoappear in proxy statements cover-
ing theyears of our empirical interest. A belief that the latter would
lean towarda fairly conservative common stock portfolio and wouJd
21 L. Fisherand i. H. Lofle, "Rates of Returnon Investments in Common
Stocks," Journal ofBusiness, January 1964, pp. I-21.
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project a fairlymodest jnvestmefltrate of returnvill therefore he the
basis of the discountrate choice.Five per ecut per annum seems tohe a
reasonable cliaracteriZ1ti0hlof the j)rObahleresult ol that kind ot attitude
Objections to thisparticular figure maythen he answered in two Ways:
Alternatives of the samegeneral order ofmagnitude will not produce
significant differencesin the calculations;and 5 per cent at least l)Cars
a sensiblerelationshiP to thediscount rate chosenearlier for (leht port-
folios.
Prevent rziid Cainji/ative Values
The size of eachcomponent "layer'' ofannual salary payments in the
current equivalentis determined byrequiring thatitsinterest-and-
mortality_discounted present valuebe equal to the corresponding yearly
estimate of the change invalue of the stock option. Inorder to facilitate
computations it will onceagain be assumed that such payments are made
on an annualrather than (in a monthlybasis. Following the cxecuti'es
exercise of his option. the paymentscredited to him in anticipation of
the reward he thereuponobtains will be euinulitted----hy compounding
annually at 5 per centto thee,i1 of the year of exercise, the convert-
tion being that all those paymentsoccurred at the beginning of their
respective years. Accordingly, thesalary increment already specified
for the year of exercise will becompounded to1 .05 times its original
amount; the increment applying tothe previouS year to (1.05)2 times
its original value, and so on. The optionexercise itself will also he con-
sidered to have occurred at the beginning of the yearand therefore be
cumulated to1 .05 times its measured value in order to compareit with
its counterpart salary payments.13v adopting this rule, we preserve
but in a more convenient formthe same relatit'e sequenceof timing
between the option gain and the current equivalent thatwould, on
average, be observed if a detailed month-by-month analsis were under-
taken. Thus, the futurity or retroactivity of a series of twelve nionth1
salary increments can be summarized fairly satisfactorily by assuming
the payment of their total amount halfway through the ear. Similarly.
See Chapter 12 for confirmation.
The only question involved here,itshouldhe strcsed,istimingThe
amount of the option gain isstill to he determined by the market price of the
stock in question on the day the option is exercised.STOCK OJ'IJONS
63
Option cxcrcics arc likelyto be distributedevenly over theyear, and the mean interest adjustmentnccessar' for them shouldalso he one-half the annual rate. If, instead, bothtransacttofls are treatedas having taken place at the beginning of thecalendar year, theyarc in etTect moved ahead in time an average ofsix months apicce,and their relationshipis not distorted. The fInal stream ofpayments in the currentequivalent__ the first element of which isscheduled byconvention for the first dayof the year after exerciseoccurs--is then establishedby setting itspresent value equal to the differencebetween the after-taxoption gain and the
indicated cumulative valueof the "anticipatory"salary payments.
Ret ire,flent
Among the executives whoreceive stock optionsare some who con-
template retirement priorto the formal terminal(late of their option
grants. For example, ten-year optionsare often issued to agroup which
contains executives age 55 andover, who must retire atage 65 under
the provisions of theircompany's pension Plan. Thetax law stipulates.
however, that the rightto exercise any option expiresthree months
following the terminationof the optionee'semployment__and retire-
ment is regarded as a "termination."Since the effective life ofthe option
in such a situation is thereforeabbreviated,it would be improperto
attribute to it a currentequivalent which would extendover the full Len-
year period nominally prescribed. Rather,the years between granting
and retirement will beconsidered the relevant interval.Except for this
change. the proceduresoutlined above for calculating theoption's "re-
placement" in the generalcase will be adhered to.
Resignation
Another eventuality thatmay require some adjustnicnt in thecurrent
equivalent is the resignation_voluntaryor otherwiseof the optionee,
Obviously, any salary incrementsbeing credited to a particularexecutive
should stop at the time hisfiriii's proxy statements tellus he leaves his
job. Unlike retirementhowever, rcsination is nota predictable factor,
and the current equivalentcannot he constructed as though the instances
in which it doesoccur could have been foreseen. In principle,anotherD
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discount like thatfor mortalityshould be adopted.[his would serve to
reduce the presentvalue of anygiven stream ofannual salary mere-
mentst0 reflectthe possibilitYthat the exeCutivemight decide tO change
jobs beforereceiving themalland would thereforeraise the amouiit of
salary needed toreplace the stockoption.
On the otherhand, it wasconcluded earlier thatexecutive job changes,
at least withrespect toindividuals at thelevel of the present sample,
were bothinfrequent and verydillicult to quantify. RecourseiIlre
more be had tothat argument. andthe assumption here will he that any
realistic discount forturnover is likely tobe small enough to be ignored.
As a result, thecomputations may slightlyunderstate the stock Option's
"true" currentequivalent.
It is not necessary eveniii theory to discount the prospective'i1tie of
the option itself, however.As indicated above, that instrumentis legally
exercisable for threemonths after the termination ofemployment. We
may reasonablyexpect the optionee toclaim this privilege if his unex-
ercised option is at allvaluable. Ifitis notand he does notthe
corresponding current equivalentwould almost surely be negligible any-
way.Iiicases where anoptionis automatically revoked upon the
resignation of the optionee, he cansimply exercise it before quitting!t
In short. an option is effectively"vested" insofar as resignation is con-
cerned.
Partial Exercises
The executives who exercise their option rights in fullwith one trans.
action are a minority. In most cases. especially those involving'cr'
large option grants, the optionee will purchase his shares in several in-
stallments over a period of years. A ten-year option for ten thousand
shares granted in 1952 may. for exaniple. be exercised for three thousand
shares in 1954, another three thousand in 1956, and a linal four thousand
in 195925 A procedure must therefore be established for the current
equivalent which allows this sort of behavior to be analyzed asveIl as
the single-exercise case.
24 The law permits hut does not requirea corporation to proVdC a three-
month grace period. See the comparable discussion of exercises han OptiOi1C(
estate, p. 58.
25 As was rioted earlier,sonic option plans require a certain pattern of par;aI
exercises.
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The mosL tpplopriatcsolution would seemto be to treat the various
partial exercisesas definitive statements of thereward derived from
their respective fractionsof the option, andto construct for eachone a separate stream of salarypaynient. Thus, in the situationdescribed, an estimate of the potential worthof the entire option wouldbe made at the close of both 1952and 1953, and theregular series of "anticipatory"
annual salary incrementsbegun accordingly. Atthe end of 1954, the
after-tax reward achievedfrom the exercise ofthree thousand shares
would be measured, three-tenthsof the accumulatedvalue of the prior
salary payments subtractedfrom that reward, anda series of payments
running through 1962 and havinga present value equal to the difference
then calculated. This wouldcomplete the portion of thecurrent equiva-
lent attributable to the 1 954option exercise. Appraisalsof the potential
worth of the remainingseven thousand shares would continueto be made and the normalprocedure for settingup further anticipatory
salary increments for themcarried out. Consequently, thetotal current
equivalent during 1955 and 1956would consist ofa fixed and a variable
component. By the end of 1956, however,another segment of theop
tion's reward will have beenestablished and a final streamof salary pay-
ments stretching from 1957 to 1962computed for it. Ultimately, allten
thousand shares will heacquired and the fullamount of the current
equivalent fixed. In effect,an option is treated as a unit untilsome por-
tion of it is exercised, afterwhich time each bloc of sharespurchased
has attributed to ita separate series of salary increments.
Multiple Option Grants
Not only do most executives takeadvantage of their stock options ina
piecemeal fashion, butmany of theni also receive several different option
grants which have overlapping terms.In theillustration above the
optionee might have been awardedan option for another five thousand
shares in 1958. its term to coincidewith that of the originalgrant up to
1962 and to continue thereafterfor an additional sixyears. Situations
of this kind can be handled in thesame way partial exercises are--by
keeping track of every optionseparately and constructing for each its
own alternative reward. The complete current equivalentfor an execu-
tive will therefore be comprised ofa number of salary increment "vec-I
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tors," the aggregateamount in any Oneyear being the sum of all the
various paymentscalculated for that yearas a resultOfevery option
granted. These figurescan be soadded because there is no real interac-
tion betweenthem. l'he 25 percent capital gains tax rateappiical)ie to
stock optionprofits is a ceiling ratethat does not vary with either the
pattern or thesize of thoseprofits. Thus. the after-tax current equivalent
of each optionis independentof all others, and they may simply be
superimp05e2
Declining Stock Prices
Once an executivehas purchased sharesunder option, subsequent
changes in the price ofthe stock involved are asserted tobe irrelevant
as. in fact,is his decision whetherand when to resell the shares acquired.
His reward is fixed bythe discount frommarket price which he claims
on the date ofexercise. Prior to that time, of course, we are verymuch
concerned with price fluctuations as adeterminant of his current equiva.
lent. A continual increasein stock prices during this interval is not only
a happy circumstancefor the optionee but is especiallymanageable from
our point of view. Therequisite current equivalent simply increases each
year accordingly. Pricedeclines imply a matching decrease. In the vast
majority of cases, that is all that will heimplied. i.e., the successive
annual salary increments become smaller hut remainpositive. An exam-
ple of such a pattern was seen in the illustration used to supplementthe
initial description of the current equivalent. Variations in therelevant
payments are automatically smoothed by spreading out over aperiod of
years the "salary substitute" for eachear's change in the executive's
prospective after-tax option reward and by establishing equivalence on
a present value basis. If. instead, the procedure of awarding a lunip-stim
cash bonus equal to the annual change in option value were adopted.
negative payments would be necessary quite often. In the example cited.
the current equivalent would have consisted of an S85.1t0() bonus in
1953, a SI 70.000 bonus in 1954. and then-----apart from any adjust-
ments for interest accumulationa 55 1 .000 levy against salary in
The same conclusion holds for the flat15 per cent rate a.stimed here a
an approximation to the Impact of tax deferral, tax avoidance at death. and
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l9S5.In the interest of offeringa sensible alternative to thestock option, it seems importantto minimize the likelihoodof having to appro-
priate a portion of the optionee'ssalary if stock prices shouldever fall. Under the method advocatedhere a decline in pricewill, with few
exceptions, merely cause theoptionee to forego receiptof some of the
later installments of the salaryincreases promised whenprices were high.
If, for instance, the potentialworth of an unexercjsedten-year option
should decrease by $100,000during its fifthyear, the counterpart of
that change would bea reduction of about $25,000per year for the next
five years in the previouslyscheduled salary increments.2s
This method does not, however,eliminate entirely the possibilitythat
a negative current equivalentmay at times be called for. Whilean actual
loss by the executiveon his option is ruled outhe simplyneed not
exercise when the option priceexceeds market pricea sharpincrease
in stock prices during the earlyyears of the grant followed bya sharp
drop can create a situation wherethe employer firm should "takeback"
part or all of the initial salary incrementsawarded. Thus, although the
aggregate interest-adjusted currentequivalent will at worst just cancel
itself out over the term of theoption, one segment of itmay have to be
negative.
Either of two responsescan be made if such a situation shouldoc-
cur: We can adhere to the "theory" of thecurrent equivalent and in-
clude in it the necessary negativevalues, or we can specify thatzero
be the smallest permissibleannual salary "increment." The latteris
almost certainly preferable froman operational standpoint. It seems
improbable that a corporation wouldpropose to its executives a scheme
that might require themto "indemnify" itif early stock option fore-
casts turn out to have been toooptimisticeven if a corollary of that
optimism was a generoustemporary salary increase. One somehow
finds it difficult to conceive ofa policy of that sort being carried out in
practice and, if practicality isto be claimed here, this consideration is
not irrelevant.
The effect on the empirical resultsof adopting the alternativepro-
Actual after-tax rewardwas $204,000.
23 As willbe seen below, the smoothing inherentinthe approach chosen also servestoreduce the over-all tax burden associated withabe/ore-taxsalary alternative to the option.EXECUTI'ECOPENS\TR)r'
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cedure depends onsuhseClUeIt CVCflS.In cases where the stock price
later recovers,the currentequivalent will once againbecome positive
and, in the end.only its patternarid not its aggregate value will have
beenaltercd.2If, however, theprice (IOCS not recover sufficiently, the
optioflec will havebeen creditedwith too much salary. His current
equivalent, underwhich payments wereawarded for at least a few
years, will be morevaluable than the optionitself, which iseither
entirelyworthless or nearlyso.Fortunately,thissecondsituation
arises fairly infrequently;even when itdoes, the spreading out of any
initial positive incrementswill keep the resulting errorfrom being very
great.3° The position may'therefore he taken that to rulenegative
elements out of thecurrent equivalent is notonlya sensible concession
to practicality butis also unlikely to havemuch effect on the findings.'
The same sort of reasoningapplies to situations in which the execu-
tive never does exercisehis option because the niarkct price of the
shares involved falls belowand remains below the option price. In
principle again, any incrementalsalary payments credited to him at
the Lime a profit seemed tobe in prospect should be recovered via an
eventual levy on salary. Byconvention here, they are not.
The Before-Tax Current Equivalent
Given a definition of the reward providedby an option and a format
for determining its after-tax salary counterpart,the final stepisto
compute a before-tax current equivalent: thatseries of additions to the
executive's actual before-tax salary which will generate thevarious
annual increments implied by the (sum of the) after-tax equivalent(s).
A vehicle is thereby obtained which l)ermitS the relative importanceof
stock options and other compensation devices to he measured on a
common pre-tax basis and which can be used subsequently to assess
the "efficiency" of a particular option by comparing its cost with that
29For an example, see the illustration in Chapter 6. pp. 97--101.
The extent of the 'error" involved and the frequency ofitsoccurrence
empirically are discussed below in Chapter 1 2.
:1While this is true for the time period covered h' this study,it may or
may not be so in the future. Stock market conditions will not necessarily COfl
tinueto be favorable, andthepossibility of unprofitablestockoption C5
periences may well increase.STOCK OPTIONS 69
olitscurrent income substitute.Becausetileunderlying after-tax
equivalent is constructed in a way that shouldprevent wide variations
inits constituent annual figures, thenecessary before-tax increments
will also be "smoothed." This will help keeptheir aggregate amount--
and thus their total cost to the firmas lowas possible, since a progres-
sive personal income tax schedule subjectsfluctuating incomes to a
higher over-all effective rate than stableones.
Summary
A stock option is a deferred and contingent compensationdevice whose
effectivenessis most appropriately measured afterthe fact. Despite
the uncertainties involved, it is possible to designa current income al-
ternative that covers the same span ofyears as the term of the option,
that has the same time-adjusted after-tax value, that couldbe used as
an operational substitute for the option, and that should have thesame
incentive features. Within such a framework, the rewardsprovided by
stock optionseven though unique intheir characteristics--can he
meaningfully compared with an executive's other earnings.32
Once again, the readerisreferredto Appendix G, which describes the
manner in which the procedures developed above can he nrndiIied tofitthe
changes in the tax treatment of stock options embodied in the RevenueAct of
1964.